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Abstract
This paper addresses several basic problems inspired by the adaptation of economic mechanisms,
and auctions in particular, to the Internet. Computational environments such as the Internet offer
a high degree of flexibility in auctions’ rules. This makes the study of optimal auctions especially
interesting in such environments. We present an upper bound on the revenue obtained by a seller in
any auction with a fixed number of participants, and we show that this bound may be a least upper
bound in some setups. We further show that the revenue obtained by standard auctions (e.g., English
auctions) approaches the theoretical bound, when the number of participants is large. Our results
heavily rely on the risk-aversion assumption made in the economics literature. We further show that
without this assumption, the seller’s revenue (for a fixed number of participants) may significantly
exceed the upper bound if the participants are sufficiently risk-seeking. Ó 2000 Elsevier Science B.V.
All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
The Internet exhibits forms of interactions which are not captured by current studies and
theories in Economics. The highly distributed nature of the Internet, the relatively easy
access to trades carried out in remote locations, and the ability of defining various types
of Internet trades by individual users, lead to new kind of settings for which new theories
should be developed and evaluated.
The Internet is a distributed environment where self-interested parties may interact. The
strategic interaction among agents is a major topic of study in microeconomics [8] and
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game theory [5]. In particular, the design of protocols for strategic interactions is the subject
of the field termed mechanism design [5,8,16]. Research on strategic aspects of multi-agent
activity in Artificial Intelligence has grown rapidly in the recent years. Work in AI has
mostly concentrated on the design of protocols for agents’ interaction. Hence, work in AI
shares much in common with work on mechanism design in Economics (see, e.g., [2–4,7,
18,20]). In addition, the idea of using microeconomic tools for problem solving has also
been the subject of market-oriented approaches to distributed planning [22]. Many basic
principles and ideas for the design of multi-agent AI systems grew up from the mechanism
design literature. Much of the research in mechanism design has been devoted to the study
of auctions [10,12,15,17,23]. There are two reasons for that. One is the popularity of
auctions as selling mechanisms, and the other is the understanding that many of the features
studied in the auctions literature shed light on other economic mechanisms [5]. Evidently,
auctions have turned to be most popular mechanisms in electronic commerce as well, and
the number of different auctions carried out in the Internet is huge.
In an auction a good is sold to a single buyer taken from a set of potential buyers (or
more generally, several goods are sold to a set of agents), according to some bidding
rules and rules for determining the auction’s outcome (i.e., the winner and the prices
to be paid). There are several auctions that have been found to be representative ones,
and which are most widely used in Economic trades. Basic theories regarding these
auctions have been developed and few basic results on the seller’s revenue in different
types of auctions have been obtained (e.g., [12,15]). Some preliminaries regarding basic
auction theory will be presented in the next section. Given the popularity of auctions in
the Internet, and their fundamental role in Economic theories, the adaptation of auction
theory to computational settings becomes a task of considerable importance. Naturally,
when one considers trade in computational settings, he may wish to consider the effects
of computational bounds on agents’ behavior in auctions. This is the approach taken for
example in [19]. However, as we show, the computational setting also suggests the need
for a careful study of basic issues in economics that have (somewhat surprisingly) been
neglected.
The Internet is a computational setting, with flexible software which is used by relatively
sophisticated users. This makes the study of optimal auctions (e.g., [9,16,17]) highly
relevant to this setting. In an optimal auction the seller chooses an auction mechanism
that maximizes her revenue in equilibrium. A major claim against using optimal (non-
standard) auctions is that they are hard to handle, but given the computational environment
this task becomes much more reasonable and doable. All that is needed in order to
define and manage a new kind of auction is a simple software; typical Internet users
will have little problem in participating in such auctions. Indeed, the reader may easily
find in the Internet various novel modifications of existing auctions. This leads to the
following central questions. What is an upper bound on the revenue one can obtain by
an optimal auction, can it be obtained in certain cases, and can it be obtained by classical
auctions?
We show:
(1) The expected highest valuation of an object from the point of view of the participants
is an upper bound on the expected gain a seller can obtain in any auction with risk-
averse (and in particular with risk-neutral) agents. This result is not obvious given
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that the bids of agents in equilibria (in some relatively standard auctions) may be
higher than their actual valuation for the good. This result solves a basic problem in
the theory of optimal auctions.
(2) There are cases (information structures) in which the above-mentioned upper
bounded is a least upper bound.
(3) If the number of participants is large, the seller’s expected revenue in an English
auction approaches the upper bound.
Another basic characteristic of electronic commerce is the relatively high risk for the
buyers, and in particular the doubtful commitment power of the seller. This suggests that
one may wish to relax the assumption that the buyers are risk-averse (or risk-neutral)
agents, that is (always) taken in economics. How does the expected revenue of the seller
(in relatively standard auctions) change when we remove the risk-aversion assumption?
We show:
(4) Without the risk-aversion assumption, there exists an auction mechanism (a third-
price auction) in which the seller can obtain a revenue that is higher than the
expected highest valuation for the good.
In Section 2 we introduce some preliminaries. In particular, we describe the classical
model of auctions. In Section 3 we present an upper bound on the revenue obtained by
the seller in any auction for risk-averse (or risk-neutral) agents. We also show that there
are cases where the above-mentioned upper bounded is a least upper bound. In Section 4
we also show that this upper bound can be almost matched in English auctions when
the number of agents is large enough. In Section 5 we discuss the potential need for
modeling agents as having a risk-seeking attitude, and show that in this case a third-price
auction can lead to a seller’s revenue that is higher than the previously mentioned upper
bound.
2. Preliminaries
Consider a seller who wishes to sell a particular good, where there are n agents denoted
by 1,2, . . . , n who wish to buy this good. An auction is a procedure in which participants
submit messages (typically monetary bids) for the good. 2 The auction’s rules specify the
type of messages, and as a function of the messages submitted by the participants they
determine the winner and the payments to be made by the participants (to the auction
organizer). Formally, an auction procedure (or an auction mechanism) for n potential
participants with the names {1,2, . . . , n} is characterized by four parameters, M,g, c, d ,
where M is a set of messages, g = (g1, . . . , gn) with gi :Mn → [0,1] for all i and∑n
i=1 gi(m) 6 1 for all m, and c = (c1, . . . , cn);d = (d1, . . . , dn) with ci, dj :Mn→ R
for all i, j . Participant i submits a messagemi ∈M . Let m= (m1,m2, . . . ,mn) be a vector
of messages, then the organizer conducts a lottery to determine the winner, in which the
probability that i is the winner equals gi(m). The winner, say j , pays cj (m) and every
2 These messages can also refer to complete strategies. Hence, the analysis does not refer only to one-shot
interactions.
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other participant i pays di(m). It is assumed that M contains the null message e, which is
interpreted as non-participation. It is further assumed that ifmi = e, then gi(m)= ci(m)=
di(m)= 0. An auction procedure is anonymous if its rules do not depend on the names of
the players. More precisely, for every one-to-one function pi : {1,2, . . . , n}→ {1,2, . . . , n},
fi(mpi(1),mpi(2), . . . ,mpi(n))= fpi(i)(m1,m2, . . . ,mn),
where f stands for g, c, or d . In this paper we deal only with anonymous auction
procedures.
Classical auction theory associates a (Bayesian) game with each auction procedure
and analyzes the behavior of the agents under the equilibrium assumption. In order to
associate a game with an auction procedure we have to define two additional parameters,
the information structure and the utility functions of the players in the game. In this paper
the information structure is given by a vector F = (Fi)ni=1 of distribution functions on
R+. Let ( v̂i)ni=1 be mutually independent non-negative random variables such that the
distribution of v̂i is Fi , that is, Fi(v) = Prob( v̂i 6 v). If v̂i = vi , vi is interpreted as
the maximal willingness to pay of Agent i and it is called the type of i . 3 The unique
probability measure induced by Fi on R+ is denoted by Pi . Let P denote the product
probability measure of (Pi)ni=1 on R
n+ and let P−i denote the product probability measure
defined by (Pj )j∈N\{i} on RN\{i}, where N = {1,2, . . . , n}. The utility structure is given
by a vector u = (ui)ni=1 of utility functions for money. Agent i has the utility function
ui :R→R, normalized with ui(0)= 0. It is assumed that ui is increasing and that Agent i
is an expected utility maximizer. It is further assumed that if Agent i with the type vi
receives the item and pays xi , his utility is ui(vi − xi). Agent i is risk-averse if ui is a
concave function. A risk-averse agent weakly prefers a certain amount to a lottery whose
expected payoff equals this amount. Agent i is risk-neutral if ui is linear. Such an agent
is indifferent between a lottery and its expected payoff. 4 Agent i is risk-seeking if ui is
convex. A strategy for agent i is a measurable function bi :R+ →M , where bi(vi) is the
message submitted by i when his type is vi . We identify two strategies of i that coincide
almost surely with respect to Pi .
Let b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn) be an n-tuple of strategies. b is in equilibrium if for every
agent i and for almost every vi (with respect to Pi ), the expected utility of agent i
given that his type is vi and given that each agent j , j 6= i , uses bj is maximized over
mi ∈M atmi = bi(vi). Before expressing the above verbal description with the appropriate
formulas we remark that this definition makes sense only if certain technical conditions are
imposed on all functions under discussion. For simplicity we do not explicitly present
3 We use the independent-private-value model of information. There exist more complicated information
models in which an agent does not know his own type, and/or the agents’ types are correlated [12]. We believe
that the independence assumption is the right one in the Internet auctions setup where there are many anonymous
participants.
4 Notice that a risk-neutral agent is a specific instance of a risk-averse agent. A risk-neutral agent has (up to an
increasing linear transformation) a specific utility function (ui(x)= x), while the set of concave utility functions
that represent risk-averse agents is huge. In fact, the standard assumption in Economics is that agents/buyers are
risk-averse, and the assumption of risk-neutral agents is taken only as an approximation to risk-averse agents, for
mathematical convenience.
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these conditions. 5 For a vector of strategies b = (bi)i∈N we denote b−i = (bj )j 6=i ,
for v ∈ RN+ we denote b(v) = (b1(v1), b2(v2), . . . , bn(vn)) and for agent i we denote
b−i (v−i )= (bj (vj ))j 6=i . Thus, b is in equilibrium if for every agent i and for almost every
type vi (with respect to Pi ),
max
mi∈Mi
EP−i
(
ui
(
vi − ci(mi, b−i )
)
gi(mi, b−i )+ ui
(−di(mi, b−i ))(1− gi(mi, b−i )))
is attained at mi = bi(vi), where EP−i denotes the expected value operator with respect to
P−i . Some pathological auction games do not possess equilibrium strategies. In this paper
we do not deal with auction games that are over complicated in the sense that they do
not possess an equilibrium. To summarize, an auction game is a 4-tuple G= (n,A,F ,u),
where n > 2, A is an anonymous auction procedure for n potential participants, F is an
information structure, and u is a utility structure.G is called information-symmetric if there
exists a distribution function F such that Fi = F for all i . G is called utility-symmetric if
ui = uj for all i, j .
Under the equilibrium assumption (i.e., the assumption that economic agents use
equilibrium strategies), if the auction game G = G(n,A,u,F ) has a unique equilibrium
profile b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn), then the seller expected revenue in equilibrium is denoted by
RG. That is,
RG =EP
(
n∑
i=1
(
gi(b)ci(b)+
(
1− gi(b)
)
di(b)
))
.
When the auction game has more than one equilibrium profile, we denote by RG the
revenue of the seller in the worst case, that is the greatest lower bound of the revenues
obtained in some equilibrium. As we said, we do not consider auction games that are over
complicated in the sense that they do not have an equilibrium. Consider a fixed number
of participants n, a fixed information structure F , and a fixed vector of utility functions u
with ui = u for all i and u(x)= x for all x . Myerson [15] solved the optimality problem
maxARG and in addition he showed that if the distribution functions are the uniform
distributions on bounded intervals, an optimal auction procedure is a second-price auction
with an appropriate reservation price determined by the information structure. Maskin and
Riley [9] investigated the optimality problem with a fixed symmetric information structure
and a fixed symmetric utility structure in which ui = u for all i , and u is a concave
function. Their results indicate, that if an optimal solution exists, it should involve a very
sophisticated auction procedure.
2.1. Classical auction mechanisms
In this section we discuss some classical auction mechanisms and show how they can be
described in the framework mentioned above.
5 For example, no problem arise if we assume a discrete model in which the message space M is finite and each
v̂i takes only finitely many values. In the economic literature it is common to deal with a continuous setup and to
require smoothness conditions. In particular, it is assumed that the utility functions and the distribution functions
are twice continuously differentiable.
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First-price auctions
One of the most popular auction mechanisms is the first-price auction. In such an
auction, each participant submits a bid in a sealed envelop. The agent with the highest
bid wins the object and pays his bid, all other participants pay nothing. Ties are broken
with some lottery mechanism. In a first-price auction, M = R+ ∪ {e}, and for x ∈ RN+ ,
gi(x) = 0, if xi < w(x) = max{xj : j ∈ N}, and gi(x) = 1/k(x) if xi = w(x) and k(x)
denotes the number of agents j for which xj =w(x). Also, ci(x)= xi and di(x)= 0. 6 In
the next section we will use the standard equilibrium analysis of first-price auctions that
we now present: We assume that all agents are symmetric (ui = u) and Fi = F for all i ,
and that F is supported in the interval [0,1] in the sense that F(0) = 0, F(1) = 1, and
F ′(x) > 0 for all x ∈ [0,1]. It can be shown that if u is twice continuously differentiable,
u′(x) > 0 for all x , and u/u′ is increasing, then there exists a unique equilibrium,
(b1, b2, . . . , bn)= (s, s, . . . , s), where s is the unique solution of the differential equation
defined on [0,1] by (see [17]):
s′(v)= (n− 1)u(v− s(v))F
′(v)
u′(v − s(v))F (v) ; s(0)= 0.
In particular, if the agents are risk-neutral and F(x) = x is the uniform distribution on
[0,1], then s(v)= ((n− 1)/n)v for all v ∈ [0,1].
k-price auctions
In a k-price auction each participant submits a bid in a sealed envelop, the winner is the
one with the highest bid and he pays the k-highest bid in the vector of bids. For example,
in a second-price auction if the three highest bids were 10,9 and 8, then the winner is the
one whose bid was 10, and he pays 9. However, if the highest bids were 10, 10, 9, then
the winner is selected with a probability 0.5 from the two agents with the bid of 10, and
he pays 10. It can be easily verified (and it is well known) that in a second-price auction,
the strategies bi(vi) = vi are in equilibrium for every information and utility structures.
k-price auctions, k > 3 have the interesting feature that in equilibrium the agents overbid
(see [6,13,14,23]). That is, bi(vi) > vi .
English auctions (ascending auctions)
The English auction is the most popular open auction. In such an auction, there is an
initial reservation price (which can be zero) and at each time every player can increase the
bid publicly. The auction is over if for a certain (fixed in advanced) time period no one
increases the bid. The agent with the last bid wins the object and pays the last bid. Such
an auction, like all other open auctions, is analyzed in the framework described above
by defining the message space M to be the set of strategies (protocols) in the dynamic
game induced by the mechanism. Though formally, participants do not actually have to
submit a protocol, it is obvious that had they have to do it, they will submit their true
6 If the seller announces a participation fee of c > 0, then ci (x)= xi + c and di (x)= c.
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protocol, because this protocol is optimal with respect to their beliefs concerning the
behavior of the other participants. The precise formulation of the dynamic game associated
with the auction procedure is not an easy task. Milgrom and Weber [12] provided one
such formulation for a modification of the Japanese variant of the English auction. 7 It is
interesting to note that English auctions (at least in the variant (and setup) discussed in [12])
are equivalent to second-price auctions in the sense that for every vector of types, both
auctions yield the same winner and the same payoffs to the organizer. In particular, the
seller’s revenue in both auctions is identical. 8
Dutch auctions (descending auctions)
In a Dutch auction, the auctioneer initially calls for a very high price, and then
continuously lowers the price until some bidder stops the auction and claims the good
for that price. Dutch auctions are strategically equivalent to first-price auctions, and in
particular, the expected revenue of the seller in both auctions coincide.
3. An upper bound on the seller’s expected revenue
In this section we supply an upper bound on the expected revenue obtained by the
seller in any auction for risk-averse agents. We will be able to show that no matter how
sophisticated an auction mechanism is, although agents may have bids that are higher than
their actual evaluation of a good 9 the seller’s revenue cannot be higher than the expected
highest valuation for this good of the auction’s participants. We further show that there
exists an information structure for which our bound is a least upper bound.
Theorem 1. Let G = (n,A,F ,u) be an auction game with risk-averse participants that
possesses an equilibrium. Then for every equilibrium strategy profile b = (b1, b2, . . . , bn),
the expected revenue of the seller from the auction is bounded by the expected highest type.
That is,
RG 6EP
(
max( v̂1, v̂2, . . . , v̂n)
)
.
Proof. Consider agent i , who participates in the auction, and denote the expected revenue
from agent i by Ri . If agent i is of type vi , then his expected utility Bi(vi) when bidding
b(vi), while the bidding strategies of the other agents are bj , j 6= i , is given by:
Bi(vi)=EP−i
(
ui
(
vi − ci
(
bi(vi), b−i
))
gi
(
bi(vi), b−i
)
+ ui
(−di(bi(vi), b−i))(1− gi(bi(vi), b−i))).
7 In the Japanese variant, the price is raised continuously, and a bidder who wishes to be active at the current
price presses a button. When he releases the button, he has withdrawn from the auction. We do not know the
source of the term “Japanese” used in [12].
8 This equivalence principle does not hold if we do not assume the independence of types (see [12]).
9 See the discussion of k-price auctions in the previous section.
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As i can always choose not to participate we conclude that Bi(vi) > 0. Because ui is
concave (i.e., ui(αx + (1− αy)> αui(x)+ (1− α)ui(y)), we have that
EP−i
(
ui
((
vi − ci
(
bi(vi), b−i
))
gi
(
bi(vi), b−i
)
+ (−di(bi(vi), b−i)(1− gi(bi(vi), b−i))))> 0.
Because ui is concave, Jensen inequality (i.e., ui(E(·))>E(ui(·))) implies that:
ui
(
EP−i
((
vi − ci
(
bi(vi), b−i
))
gi
(
bi(vi), b−i
)
+ (−di(bi(vi), b−i)(1− gi(bi(vi), b−i)))))> 0.
Because ui is increasing and ui(0)= 0,
EP−i
((
vi − ci
(
bi(vi), b−i
))
gi
(
bi(vi), b−i
)
+ (−di(bi(vi), b−i)(1− gi(bi(vi), b−i))))> 0.
Let Ri(vi) be the expected revenue from Agent i given that his type is vi . The last
inequality yields
Ri =EPi (Ri)6EP
(
v̂igi (b)
)
.
Therefore
RG =
n∑
i=1
Ri 6EP
(
n∑
i=1
v̂igi (b)
)
6EP
(
max( v̂i)
n
i=1
)
,
because
∑n
i=1 gi(b)6 1. 2
We now show that when each Fi is the uniform distribution on a given bounded interval,
then the upper bound of Theorem 1 is a least upper bound (l.u.b.).
Proposition 1. Let n> 2. Let A be the first-price auction mechanism for n participants.
Let 06A<B <∞, and let F = (Fi)ni=1 be the symmetric information structure in which
Fi is the uniform distribution over [A,B] for all i . Then
sup
u
R(n,A,F,u) =EP
(
max( v̂i)
n
i=1
)
,
where u ranges over all utility structures of risk-averse agents for which the associated
auction game possesses equilibrium.
Proof. By Theorem 1,
sup
u
R(n,A,F,u) 6EP
(
max( v̂i )
n
i=1
)
.
We show that equality holds in the above inequality when there are two participants
(n = 2), and each Fi, i = 1,2, is the uniform distribution over [0,1]. The proof of the
general case is similar. For every m> 2 consider the auction game Gm in which the utility
functions satisfy ui = um, i = 1,2, where
um(x)= 1− e−mx for every x ∈R.
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We will show that when m approaches infinity the expected gain in the auction game Gm
approaches EP (max( v̂1, v̂2)). From the equilibrium equation for first price auction given
in Section 2 we can deduce that the auction game Gm possesses a unique equilibrium
(b1, b2) such that bi = sm for all i and
s′m(v)=
1− e−m(v−sm(v))
mve−m(v−smv)
.
Therefore,
s′m(v)=
emv − emsm(v)
mvemsm(v)
,
or
(vemsm(v))′ = emv.
As sm(0)= 0,
sm(v)= 1
m
ln
(
emv − 1
mv
)
, 0< v 6 1.
Let v̂max =max{̂v1, v̂2}, then the expected revenue of the seller is Rm = E(sm( v̂max)). As
the distribution of v̂max is G(v)= v2, we have that
Rm =
1∫
0
sm(v)2v dv.
Using standard calculus techniques, it can be shown that sm(v)6 v and that limm→∞ sm(v)
= v for all v ∈ [0,1]. Therefore, by the Lebesque’s convergence theorem,
lim
m→∞Rm =
1∫
0
2v2 dv =E( v̂max).
Hence, supu R(n,A,F,u) =E( v̂max). 2
4. Almost optimal auctions
Consider a seller who wishes to conduct an auction in a setup with many potential buyers
(e.g., the Internet). The seller knows the number of potential participants 10 as well as the
symmetric information structure. That is he knows F such that Fi = F for all i . However,
he cannot possibly know the utility structure. In order to maximize his revenue, the seller
may behave as a Bayesian agent, that is he can assign a probability to each possible vector
of utility functions and compute his expected revenue for each possible auction procedure.
Even if the seller can assign a “reasonable” probability distribution over utility structures,
the Bayesian approach cannot be considered as a practical solution because of the very high
level of computational complexity. Another possible solution is to assume that all agents
10 Our results can be extended to the case of random number of participants. See Section 7.
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are risk-neutral in their relation to money in the relevant range and to use Myerson’s result
mentioned in Section 2. That is, to conduct a second-price auction with an appropriate
reservation price. In this section we show that when F is supported in a bounded interval,
this approach makes sense, not only because it is the best the seller can do in the risk-
neutral case, but rather because the second-price auction procedure is almost optimal for
every utility structure of risk-averse agents if the number of participants is sufficiently
large.
Assume that the distribution functionF satisfies F(A)= 0, F(B)= 1,F is continuously
differentiable in [A,B], and F ′(x) > 0 for every x ∈ (A,B). Let ( v̂i)∞i=1 be a sequence of
i.i.d. random variables, where each v̂i is distributed according to F . We denote by vnmax
the first-order statistics (that is, the highest type) of ( v̂i)ni=1, and we denote by vnsec, the
second-order statistics (that is, the second-highest type). Let Rnmax = E(vnmax) denote the
expected value of the first-order statistics amongst ( v̂i )ni=1, and let Rnsec = E(vnsec) denote
the expected value of the second-order statistics. It can be shown that for every utility
structure (ui)ni=1, the second-price auction game with the symmetric information structure
given by F has a unique equilibrium in which bi(vi)= vi for every vi ∈ [A,B]. Therefore
the expected revenue of the seller in this game equals Rnsec. Thus, the expected revenue of
the seller in a second-price auction game does not depend on the utility structure.
Theorem 2. Let 0 6 A < B <∞. Let F be a distribution function on R+ that satisfies
F(A) = 0, F(B) = 1, and F ′(x) > 0 for every A < x < B . Let ( v̂i )∞i=1 be a sequence
of independent and identically F -distributed random variables. For every n > 2, let An
be the second-price auction mechanism for n participants, let F(n)= (F1, . . . ,Fn) be the
information structure for n participants in which Fi = F for every 1 6 i 6 n, and let
u(n)= (ui,n)ni=1 be a sequence of utility functions.
Then
lim
n→∞
RGn
Rnmax
= 1,
where Gn is the second-price auction game (n,An,F (n),u(n)).
Proof. As RGn =Rnsec, we have to show that
lim
n→∞
Rnsec
Rnmax
= 1.
Without loss of generality we can assume that [A,B] = [0,1]. We will prove that both,
limn→∞Rnmax = 1 and limn→∞Rnsec = 1. By the Lebesque’s dominance convergence
theorem it suffices to show that limn→∞ vnmax = 1 almost surely and that limn→∞ vnsec = 1
almost surely. It can be easily deduced from Theorem 1 [21, p. 251], that a sequence of
random variables (Xn)∞n=1 converges to a random variable X if for every 0< ε < 1,
∞∑
n=1
Prob
(|X−Xn|> ε)<∞.
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It can be easily verified that the distribution function of vnmax is F(x)n, and that the
distribution function of vnsec is nF(x)n−1 − (n− 1)F (x)n (see, e.g., [1]). Therefore, for
0< ε < 1
∞∑
n
Prob
(
1− vnmax > ε
)= ∞∑
n=1
F(1− ε)n <∞,
and
∞∑
n
Prob
(
1− vnsec > ε
)= ∞∑
n=1
(
nF(1− ε)n−1 − (n− 1)F (1− ε)n)<∞,
because F(1− ε) < 1. 2
As English auctions are equivalent to second-price auctions, Theorem 2 (combined with
Theorem 1) shows that in the information-symmetric independent-private-value model,
when agents are risk-averse, the optimal expected revenue can be almost obtained in an
English auction, when the number of agents is large enough (which one may expect in
Internet auctions). Moreover, this result holds uniformly for all utility structures, in the
sense that the number of participants that is needed to guarantee ε-optimality does not
depend on the utility functions of the participants.
Our results have also an interpretation which is somewhat complementary to the famous
revenue equivalence principle [15]. The famous revenue equivalence theorem implies that
we can not improve upon the revenue obtained in classical auctions when the agents are
risk-neutral. Our results tell us that this implication is almost true in a setup with many
participants (e.g., Internet auctions) and arbitrary utility structures of risk-averse agents
(which is the most general case discussed in the literature).
5. Risk-seeking agents
The number of Internet auctions grow relatively fast, and various modifications for
the classical auctions are considered. However, as we have shown, under the classical
assumptions made in Economics one can not go far in optimizing the seller’s revenue.
In this part of the paper we wish to consider a different kind of setting that may explain
some of the phenomena that occur in the Internet setting, and which explore the potential
of obtaining a revenue that is higher than the highest participants’ valuation.
Indeed, most of the Internet auctions are English auctions, which are known to be
strategically equivalent to second-price auctions. There used to be some Dutch auctions
(which are strategically equivalent to first-price auctions) but they seem to disappear. On
the other hand, a central theorem of auction theory is that the expected revenue obtained
by the seller in first-price auctions is greater than her expected revenue in second-price
auctions, assuming the agents are risk-averse [9,17]. So, how can one explain this situation?
One way of explaining the related phenomena is by considering participants that are risk-
seeking rather than risk-averse. Although this assumption does not appear in classical work
in Economics, it may make sense in the Internet setting. Indeed, in the Internet setting
agents attempt to buy items that they can not really see, and that are sold by an unknown
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seller, and with no real commitment of the seller. On the other hand, the buyers need to
reveal their credit card information. Although we do not formally argue for this point,
we believe that the modeling of agents as having a risk-seeking attitude rather than risk-
aversion attitude should be treated carefully and seriously. In another paper [13] we discuss
the risk-seeking assumption and show that if the agents are risk-seeking then second-price
auctions lead to higher revenue to the seller than first-price auctions. We wish now to
re-consider our upper bound on the seller’s revenue in view of this different modeling
perspective. Technically, the only difference from the previously mentioned setting, is that
in the case of risk-seeking agents the utility function will be convex rather than concave.
It is well known that a risk-neutral seller can sell lottery tickets with negative expected
gain to a risk-seeking agent and obtain as a result very high gains. Our aim here is different.
We wish to show that a value that is higher than the upper bound obtained, can be achieved
in what can be considered as standard auctions. In particular, we consider the third-price
auction, which is another (less studied) instance of k-price auctions [6,14,23].
We will discuss the equilibrium set of a third-price auction with three participants
(n = 3) in which Fi = F for all 1 6 i 6 3, where F is the uniform distribution on
[0,1]. We assume that each participant uses the utility function ui = wα, α > 1, where
wα(x)= x when x 6 0, and wα(x)= αx for x > 0. By a slight modification in the proof
of Theorem AT in [14] 11 it can be shown that a continuous function sα defined on [0,1]
constitutes a symmetric equilibrium strategy in the auction game if and only if sα(0)= 0,
sα is increasing, and
v∫
t=0
wα
(
v− sα(t)
)
dt = 0
for every v ∈ [0,1]. Solving this integral equation yields the unique solution:
sα(v)= (1+√α )v, v ∈ [0,1].
Because of the simple structure of the utility functions, it can be shown that (b1, b2, b3)=
(sα, sα, sα) is also the unique continuous equilibrium in this game. We do not know whether
there exists non-continuous equilibrium in this game. Hence we have:
Theorem 3. A third-price auction for risk-seeking agents can lead to an expected revenue
which is higher than the expected highest participant’s valuation for the good.
Proof. Assuming that the participants use continuous strategies, we have shown above that
the expected revenue of the seller in the third-price auction described above is
Rα = (1+√α ) ·E(v[3]),
where E(v[3]) is the expected value of the third-order statistics (i.e., the expected value
of the type of the agent with the third-highest evaluation). As limα→∞Rα = ∞, for
sufficiently large α, Rα >E(max( v̂1, v̂2, v̂3)). 2
11 This theorem is proved under the assumption that the utility functions are twice continuously differentiable.
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Actually, in our case the expected first-order statistics is 3/4, while the third-order
statistics is 1/4. Hence, if α > 4 we get the desired result. Notice that if the agents are
extremely risk-seeking (α is big), then the seller can extract a very high expected revenue
in this game.
6. Remarks and conclusion
Other information structures. Theorem 1 can be extended to the general information
structure case, where the players’ types are correlated, and a player does not necessarily
know his own type. We don’t know under which conditions Theorem 2 remains valid in
this case.
Random number of participants. It is not reasonable to model Internet auctions under
the assumption that the number of participants is fixed and commonly known. However,
since we use the independent-private-value model of information, all our results can be
easily extended to the case in which the number of participants is randomly determined
(see [11]).
Conclusion. This paper has addressed several basic issues in the adaptation of economic
mechanisms to computational and artificial environments, such as the Internet. There is
much left to be done. Our upper bound can be refined in order to discuss particular classes
of auctions and utility functions, and our result about risk-seeking agents can be further
elaborated in order to find the optimal auction for risk-seeking agents. We believe that the
introduction of the related issues, which have led to non-trivial and somewhat unpredictable
results, clarify the importance and necessity of the related studies, and serve as essential
steps in the adaptation of economic mechanisms to computational environments.
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